Empathy, engagement, entrainment: the interaction dynamics of aesthetic experience by Ingar Brinck
RESEARCH REPORT
Empathy, engagement, entrainment: the interaction dynamics
of aesthetic experience
Ingar Brinck1
Received: 27 June 2016 / Accepted: 27 March 2017
 The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract A recent version of the view that aesthetic
experience is based in empathy as inner imitation explains
aesthetic experience as the automatic simulation of actions,
emotions, and bodily sensations depicted in an artwork by
motor neurons in the brain. Criticizing the simulation
theory for committing to an erroneous concept of empathy
and failing to distinguish regular from aesthetic experi-
ences of art, I advance an alternative, dynamic approach
and claim that aesthetic experience is enacted and skillful,
based in the recognition of others’ experiences as distinct
from one’s own. In combining insights from mainly psy-
chology, phenomenology, and cognitive science, the
dynamic approach aims to explain the emergence of aes-
thetic experience in terms of the reciprocal interaction
between viewer and artwork. I argue that aesthetic expe-
rience emerges by participatory sense-making and revolves
around movement as a means for creating meaning. While
entrainment merely plays a preparatory part in this, aes-
thetic engagement constitutes the phenomenological side
of coupling to an artwork and provides the context for
exploration, and eventually for moving, seeing, and feeling
with art. I submit that aesthetic experience emerges from
bodily and emotional engagement with works of art via the
complementary processes of the perception–action and
motion–emotion loops. The former involves the embodied
visual exploration of an artwork in physical space, and
progressively structures and organizes visual experience by
way of perceptual feedback from body movements made in
response to the artwork. The latter concerns the movement
qualities and shapes of implicit and explicit bodily
responses to an artwork that cue emotion and thereby
modulate over-all affect and attitude. The two processes
cause the viewer to bodily and emotionally move with and
be moved by individual works of art, and consequently to
recognize another psychological orientation than her own,
which explains how art can cause feelings of insight or awe
and disclose aspects of life that are unfamiliar or novel to
the viewer.
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Feeling with works of art: empathy and aesthetic
experience
Works of art tend to evoke strong experiences in the
viewer. In engaging with a painting or sculpture you
sometimes can feel that you are sharing experiences with it:
You have the sensation of feeling with it, of empathizing.
At other times, engaging with work of other artists, you
distinctly know you are not sharing any experiences, but
the experiences you nevertheless undergo genuinely appear
to emanate from and belong to the artwork. How are such
feelings of connectedness and estrangement with an art-
work possible?
This issue may not be as strange as it may seem, because
feeling with other people and feeling with works of art
have affinities that suggest a common basis in empathy—
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the feeling of understanding others’ experiences and
thoughts from their perspective. Empathy directly presents
you with another subjective perspective on the world than
your own, which does not seem to originate within you, but
is encountered as a fait accompli. Furthermore, both aes-
thetic experience and the experience of another person’s
subjective perspective have another qualitative profile than
everyday experience and can be strongly moving. Ignoring
functional and pragmatic properties, they are characterized
by high arousal, sustained attention, and marked personal
engagement both cognitively and emotionally (Markovic
2012; Vessel et al. 2012).
The feeling of understanding others’ subjective experi-
ences typically arise while interacting with them in the
second person. Taking the intuition that second-person and
aesthetic experience share a common basis in empathy at
face value, the present article examines the role of empathy
for aesthetic experience from a theoretical, interdisci-
plinary perspective that merges insights from psychology,
philosophy, phenomenology, and neuroscience within the
dynamic framework. Claiming that aesthetic experience
depends on moving with and being moved by the artwork,
the aim is to explain aesthetic experience in terms of the
processes that cause it to unfold by presenting a series of
empirically well-grounded hypotheses about the relational
dynamics between viewer and artwork.
Historically, following Immanuel Kant aesthetic experi-
ence has been interpreted as an intellectual feat, pleasing by
its pure form. Marked by Kant’s distinction between disin-
terested judgements of taste and bodily judgements of sense,
mainstream 19th and 20th century aesthetics ignored pre-
reflective, non-conceptual, emotional, and bodily responses
to art. The strong focus on propositional and discursive
processes left other processes largely unexplored. Today
there is wide-spread interest in the functions of emotion,
perception, and bodily sensation for aesthetic experience and
in empathy as its source (Crowther 1993; Dengerink Chaplin
2005; Freedberg 2012; Freedberg and Gallese 2007;
Haworth 1997; Scarinzi 2015; Shusterman 2000). Although
reflection and verbal interpretation may play a significant
part in aesthetic experience, they are not necessary.
The view that aesthetic experience is based in empathy
and occurs by the mental and bodily simulation of elements
depicted in the artwork recently has been resurrected in the
research on aesthetics in neurosciences. I will criticize both
the original version of the simulation theory and its con-
temporary version in neuroaesthetics, and defend a dynamic
approach to aesthetics that describes the perception of art
and aesthetic experience as embodied, embedded, and
enacted in engagement with the artwork. I suggest that
aesthetic perception is explorative and involves intelligent
perceptual and motor skills, while explaining the emergence
of aesthetic experience by reference to the relational
dynamics between viewer and artwork. I argue that viewer-
artwork interaction can be modelled as participatory sense-
making, proposing that entrainment creates an implicit
common ground that constitutes the baseline for interaction.
Drawing on research in developmental psychology on
empathy, I submit that aesthetic experience emerges by
bodily and emotional engagement with works of art via the
complementary processes of the perception–action and
motion–emotion loops. These processes enable the viewer to
move with and be moved by art.
The simulation theory of aesthetic experience:
critical remarks
The view that aesthetic experience involves empathy was
developed by Robert Vischer (1873). According to Vis-
cher, aesthetic experience consists in the genuine empathy
towards pure form, evidenced by the involuntary inclina-
tion to feel static form move freely and the spontaneous
experience of a rhythmic continuity between self and
artefact. Vischer stressed the importance of emotion and
imagination for understanding art and argued that aesthetic
experience results from Einfu¨hlung, the act of feeling into
the observed forms of works of art. The viewer places
herself at the centre of gravity of the artwork and thinks her
way into it. Then the imagination permits simulation of the
initially vague contents of sensation as sensuous concrete
form. Forms cause affects in the viewer that paired with the
free association of ideas enable aesthetic appreciation.
Wo¨lfflin (1886) explained the aesthetic experience of
architecture from a similar standpoint. Like Vischer, he
held that empathy begins in bodily simulation and ends in
mental simulation through the projection of first-person
experiences into the physical forms of buildings and art.
Elements of Vischer’s theory recur in contemporary
neuroaesthetics that investigates how aesthetic experience
depends on the ability to identify with forms in pictorial
content. In a study on dynamism perception, Massaro et al.
(2012) compare the processing of pictorial content
including human subjects with the processing of pictorial
content including nature and show that dynamism plays a
role in both cases. They explain dynamism perception
concerning human content by reference to the bodily
simulation of other agents’ actions, but cannot find a
plausible physiological explanation of it concerning nature
content. Because proprioception is implied in the pro-
cessing by parieto-premotor sensory-motor circuits that
send feedback to the visual areas in the brain, they venture
that embodiment may be relevant. The notion of embodi-
ment entails functional and constitutive dependency on
implicit sensorimotor processes and bodily experience
(Beer 2014; Clark 1997; Kirsh 1995; Varela et al. 1991;
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Wilson 2002). To elucidate how it might explain inanimate
dynamism perception, Massaro and colleagues quote
Wo¨lfflin (1886:151):
Physical forms possess a character only because we
ourselves possess a body. If we were purely visual
beings, we would always be denied an aesthetic
judgment of the physical world. But as human beings
with a body that teaches us the nature of gravity,
contraction, strength, and so on, we gather the
experience that enables us to identify with the con-
ditions of other forms.
Pursuing the research of Massaro and colleagues, Di Dio
et al. (2016) conclude that in naı¨ve subjects, human
dynamic content causes motor resonance, while static
nature content causes imaginary motor simulation that
reflects the functional potential of represented landscapes.
In spite of its broad acceptance, Vischer’s theoretical
framework faces difficulties that can be traced to his notion
of empathy. Empathy is described as consisting in two
consecutive processes: Mental states are first simulated
with the body and then mentally projected into the object. I
will clarify why this conception of empathy is problematic
by reference to the notions of simulation and projection.
To begin, simulation entails mimicking the states or
processes of the model, and successful simulation of
another person’s experiences results in the literal sharing of
her experiences. However, literal sharing stops short at
reproducing what the other person feels, which means it
ignores the gist of empathy. The function of empathy is the
opposite, viz. to recognize another person’s experiences as
his. Phenomenologically speaking, in empathy you are
confronted with the presence of a qualitative experience
that you are not living through yourself (Zahavi and Rochat
2015). The awareness of the other person’s experience as
distinct from your own permits responding to it by recip-
rocating, e.g. comforting a person who is experiencing
sadness, relieving her agony if she is experiencing pain, or
rejoicing with her if she is happy (Zahavi 2008).
Turning to projection, it involves the transfer of expe-
riences from self to other by analogy, placing oneself
instead of the other person at the centre of the process. This
procedure clearly conflicts with the reciprocal nature of
empathy. Instead the accurate perception of another per-
son’s experience requires recognizing its radical otherness.
Interpreting others in terms of one’s own experiences and
feelings complicates separating one’s own and others’
reactions and furthermore reduces the usefulness of
empathy in clinical contexts of medical practice and psy-
chotherapy (Halpern 2001, 2003). Hence, projection is not
necessary, nor desirable for empathy. We understand others
directly and non-inferentially by perceptual acquaintance
with them as living bodies (Gallagher 2001, 2008; Krueger
2012; Scheler 1954; Zahavi 2008). We simply can see what
they desire and need, fear and avoid, feel and intend.
Briefly, empathy is based in the immediate recognition of
another person’s experience as distinct from your own.
Freedberg and Gallese (2007; see also Freedberg 2012)
have advanced a version of Vischer’s theory that explains
aesthetic experience as the simulation of actions and emo-
tions by mirror neurons in the brain. They argue that the
observation of goal-directed action, artefacts via the actions
they afford, bodily and facial expression of emotion, real or
implied body movement, and traces of instrumental action
(e.g. footsteps on the ground, pencil strokes on paper, or
chisel marks on a sculpture) activates roughly the same
neurons in the observer’s brain as in the agent’s and results
in simulation of the corresponding motor action or emotion.
Hence, the simulation or mirror mechanism in the brain is
responsible for aesthetic experience.
To their advantage, Freedberg and Gallese can explain
the directness of experience, the brain’s responses being
automatic, and deny that empathy involves projection of
the observer’s own emotional reactions. However, like
Vischer they conceive of empathy as the sharing of expe-
riences, which conflicts with the core function of empathy:
reciprocity. Additionally, it is questionable that activity in
the mirror neurons is adequate for explaining qualitatively
felt aesthetic experience.
Freedberg and Gallese claim that the observation of a
movement (or action, facial expression, gaze, etc.) in an
artwork will cause simulation of the movement, similarly
to how the observation of a real movement would cause
simulation, and result in the experience of it. This raises the
question why the resulting experience would amount to an
aesthetic as opposed to regular experience of movement
and emotion. Apparently the two types of experience occur
by the same kind of operation. The obvious difference lies
in their causal history, the one being caused by observation
of a real movement, the other by observation of a move-
ment in an artwork. However, there is no mention that the
nature of the cause would influence the processing signif-
icantly; rather, the point of the theory is to provide the
same explanation in both cases. Accordingly, Freedberg’s
and Gallese’s hypothesis leaves it undetermined what
makes an experience aesthetic.
To stress, denying that the simulation hypothesis pro-
vides a satisfactory explanation of aesthetic experience is
not to deny that mirror neurons are involved in the causal
realization of responses to art. Motor, somatosensory, and
visceromotor processes are implicated in the visual pro-
cessing of works of art; the uncertainty concerns their exact
function for specifically aesthetic experience. One of the
central aims of art is to make the viewer experience
something unfamiliar or out of the ordinary. Sometimes
this amounts to presenting figurative or non-figurative
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counter images or disclosing unknown aspects of the world
and in doing so produce feelings of insight, learning, sur-
prise, or awe. Like empathy, aesthetic experience depends
on grasping the difference between one’s own experiences
and such that have their origin in others. Acknowledging
the radical otherness of those that originate in the artwork
enables the psychological re-orientation that characterizes
aesthetic experience.
Let us take stock. I have argued that the notions of
simulation and projection lead in the wrong direction.
Conceiving of aesthetic experience as a matter of motor
simulation of elements depicted in the artwork is mis-
guided, because the simulation mechanism does not dis-
tinguish aesthetically relevant information (in terms of
valence and potential action) from socially and instru-
mentally relevant information.
The nature of aesthetic perception: an acquired
skill
Like everyday experience, aesthetic experience is enacted.
Although it causally depends on the brain, it is not caused by
and realized in the brain, but in the world by an embodied
agent (Noe¨ 2004: 227; cf. Smith 2005). Aesthetic experience
arises in the active probing of a certain kind of material
artefact in physical space, viz. the work of art.
Perception is adaptive: It has evolved to keep the organism
in harmony with its niche and sustain its existence (Gibson
1986). It also is explorative: Responding to changes in the
environment demands exploring new ways to exploit it
(McGann, De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2013). The interdepen-
dence between adaptive and explorative behaviour explains
why, when ‘‘nature’’ is transformed into art, reality sometimes
appears more transparent than ever to the great satisfaction of
both artist and viewer. Exploration improves transparency.
The skillful perception of artworks manifests a kno-
whow that develops over time and gradually increases the
depth and complexity of aesthetic experience. The viewer
learns how to see and act, what to attend to and how
(Gibson 1986; Ingold 2001). Exploring works of art draws
on similar implicit and attention-guided learning and non-
representational (meta)cognitive abilities as other types of
skillful bodily action, e.g. modern dance or figure skating
(Brinck 1999). It is monitored and controlled indepen-
dently of reflection, and its progress is continuously eval-
uated, not necessarily relative to a goal (exploration may be
its own goal) but by its moment–moment quality, organi-
zation, variation, and deviation (Brinck and Liljenfors
2013). These processes form part of the over-all behaviour
and can be phenomenologically and perceptually trans-
parent, available to the agent on the personal level (Mon-
tero 2010; Toner, Montero and Moran 2015).
Phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work on
perception and art articulates a complementary outlook to
enactivism. Focusing on its performative aspects, Merleau-
Ponty (1964) describes the perception of art in the first
person. In previous work (Brinck 2003, 2007) I have
brought these theoretical perspectives together, and
describe the production and consumption of art as con-
trasting, yet interrelated dimensions of a multi-directional
practice that constitutively depends on the material and
cultural properties of the environment.
Gibson’s (1986) notions of affordance and effectivity
prove useful for explaining how artists and art lovers can
share their different experiences of art and participate in
joint practices by living in the same environment (Brinck
2003). An affordance is a functional property of an object
that exists relative to an agent and defines the sum of
possible actions that involve the object. Affordances
simultaneously constrain and enable behaviour. An effec-
tivity is a functional property of an agent that defines the
agent’s operative skills relative to the affordance of an
object in a given context. Because objects engage attention
through the functional properties that correspond to the
agent’s effectivities, an agent’s effectivities will shape her
ways of interacting with the environment, granting her
access to a limited set of affordances.
In making art, the aesthetic quality of the interaction
emerges from the particular effectivities that allow the
artist to access affordances that correspond to her personal
style (Brinck 2007). Her operative skills will determine
which information she will pick up when and how. Artists
acquire their individual style, a certain manner of engaging
with the context via sensorimotor processing, through the
repeated physical activity of producing art (Merleau-Ponty
1964). The painter Edouard Pignon (1966) describes how
an artist’s bodily experience of space and time conditions
the forms and colours of her work. He maintains that artists
develop aesthetic perception by gradually refining their
technique, and that learning to perceive and act in a dis-
tinctive way takes years of practice. I suggest that, con-
versely, viewers can learn to recognize a particular artist’s
style by familiarizing with the artist’s ways of handling the
many aspects of common space—physical, temporal,
material, social, cultural, and historical—by interacting
with the artist’s work (Brinck 2003, 2007). Repeated
encounters with art will cause viewers to develop skills for
perceiving art that progressively changes the quality of
their aesthetic experiences.
Learning takes place within socially and culturally cir-
cumscribed activities and involves the transfer of skills and
traditions by artefacts, procedures, rituals, and narratives
(Brown et al. 1989; Lave 1988). Knowledge is distributed,
extended in space and time and continuous with processes
in the environment (Hutchins 1995). Because external
Cogn Process
123
resources such as the technologies and commodities that
support cognition change over time, processes of the same
type, say, memorizing something, differ radically depend-
ing on the place and time when they occur—some
10,000 years ago, in the last century, or today (Donald
1991). This holds true for perceiving objects of art too.
Discussing how ship navigators use divider and scale to
find the way, Hutchins (2010:433) asserts that what is seen
is other than merely what is visible; it is ‘‘there by virtue of
the activity of seeing being conducted in a particular way’’.
Thus, the practices of reading the span of the scale as speed
or distance see something different in the very same visual
array. Similarly, because aesthetic experience is enacted, or
acted out, what viewers experience in engaging with works
of art is determined by what they do, know how to do, and
are ready to do (cf. Noe¨ 2004:1f). Perceptual skills such as
the ability to enact relationships among independent items
and recognize patterns that go unnoticed or have to be
calculated by less experienced subjects (Kellman and
Garrigan 2009) go hand in hand with contextualized sen-
sorimotor skills such as knowing how to practically engage
with a certain artefact (cf. McGann et al. 2013).
Perceptual and sensorimotor skills play a decisive role
for the quality of aesthetic experience and support direct,
on-line understanding of artworks, much like they support
social understanding and empathy. By way of example,
consider the many physical traces that an artist’s move-
ments and actions leave in the artwork and that witness the
craft of making it. Observing them, the novice may be able
to stepwise re-construct the creative process from a third-
person perspective and gain some insight into it. In con-
trast, the skilled viewer knows what kind of information to
look for and how to act when detecting it. She can con-
struct the causal sequence from an involved second-person
perspective and re-enact the artist’s bodily movements and
gestures with some precision, gaining access to the artist’s
way of seeing that gives the artist’s motor actions their
personal signature (Brinck 2007). Merleau-Ponty eluci-
dates the present line of thought from the perspective of
phenomenology. He writes: ‘‘I can meet in things the
actions of another and find in these actions a sense, because
they are themes of possible activity for my own body’’ and
‘‘[I] find others at the point of origin of the actions [I] im-
itate’’ (Lawlor and Toadvine 2007:146).
To return to the discussion of brain simulation in the
previous section, paying attention to the physical properties
of works of art while enacting them promotes aesthetic
experience in additional ways to those acknowledged by
neuroaesthetics. The carvings and marks in the stone of a
sculpture by chisel and hammer and the strokes of the
brush and knife against the canvas of a painting give
insights into the dynamics of the creative process and
reveal the artist’s web of intentions, sensations, and
feelings through their spatial, material, and physical prop-
erties such as direction, shape, quantity, location, relative
size, grain, refinement, delicacy, and density. Embodied
engagement with an artwork prepares for a phenomeno-
logically richer understanding than the detached, observa-
tional perspective that informs the viewer about mainly her
own reactions to the artwork.
The next section introduces the dynamic approach to
aesthetic experience, which in subsequent sections will
provide the tools for explaining the emergence of aesthetic
experience.
The dynamic approach to aesthetic experience:
making sense of art
According to dynamic systems theory, agents interact with
the physical environment by coupling to it, which entails
that agent and environment mutually and continuously
influence each other (Varela et al. 1991). Variations in
agent and environment form patterns that improve the
conditions for the interaction and serve to maintain it (Beer
2000; Thelen and Smith 1994). Cognition is set to preserve
the autonomy and continued existence of dynamic systems
by neutralizing external and internal perturbations. On the
dynamic approach, cognition is a relational, historical
process: What matters is not which internal states agents
have, but what agents do (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007;
Thompson and Stapleton 2009).
Enactivism presents a complementary account of cog-
nition in terms of how sense-making regulates the inter-
action of coupled systems (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007;
Froese and Di Paolo 2011; cf. Varela, Thompson and
Rosch 1991). By coordinating with stimuli that have sub-
jective value, agents can perceive and act on valences,
subjective positive-to-negative evaluations of experiences,
in the environment. Choosing the stimuli to which it will be
sensitive permits the agent to enact a meaningful world that
ensures its continued existence, and transforms the objec-
tive world into a place of salience and value that reflects
the needs of the individual (Thompson and Stapleton
2009).
Importantly, in the dynamic framework, social under-
standing and empathy are based in coordination, i.e. pat-
terned behaviour organized with respect to timing, rhythm,
and (de)synchronization (Di Paolo et al. 2010). Under-
standing does not include de-coding or retrieval of repre-
sentations, nor the matching or projection of emotional,
perceptual, or intentional inner experiences (Hutto 2015).
There is nothing ‘‘there’’ in the individual that waits to be
shared. Experience and meaning do not as such exist before
the interaction takes place, but are transitory phenomena
that emerge in the process of sense-making.
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Admittedly, focusing on the coordination patterns that
organize the relational dynamics of coupled systems has
limitations, because it ignores exogenous influences. It will
explain how agents make sense of the world they inhabit by
identifying the parameters that control their behaviour
without considering the environmental effects. Most con-
textual properties of significance for cognition have been
tuned to human agents by biological evolution and in a
shorter historical perspective epistemic niche construction,
and systematically influence perception and action (Barker
1968; Brinck 2009; Donald 1991; Heft 2007). Sense-
making is embedded: functionally and constitutively
dependent on temporal, material, technical, social, and
cultural aspects of the environment. Haugeland (1998)
describes the embeddedness of embodied agency in Hei-
deggerian terms as the intimacy of the mind’s being in the
world, characterized by an integralness of mind, body, and
world that undermines their very distinctness.
Aesthetic experience is scaffolded by technology and
material culture and socio-culturally by rituals, habits,
norms, and scripts. While large societies often show great
diversity in the expression of art, the artworks nevertheless
are fundamentally interrelated, because they are grounded
in the same material culture (Malafouris 2013). The inte-
gralness of mind, body, and world permit understanding
how art can work its wonders. What individual agents can
do and how they interact depend on what material, tech-
nological, and symbolic resources are available to them,
and if and how they can access these resources (Brinck
2003). Given that artist and viewer are contemporary and
take part in the same material culture, the interdependence
between cognition and environment causes the artist to
create art and the viewer to make sense of it in ways that
intrinsically connect.
To repeat, as opposed to theories that explain cognition
by the properties of the agents, the dynamic approach
explains cognition in terms of the relational dynamics
between the agents. The emphasis on relational instead of
agent properties makes it possible to model agent-artefact
interaction on agent-agent interaction. In the present con-
text, doing so will have the advantage of representing the
causal influence between viewer and artwork as bi-direc-
tional, and avoids downgrading the contribution of the
artwork or exaggerating the viewer’s efforts as a mere
effect of the explanatory framework. To the same end, I
suggest conceiving of aesthetic experience as the result of
participatory sense-making that generates significance by
joint interaction (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). This will
reveal features of the interaction that unidirectional
frameworks do not capture such as reciprocity.
Participatory sense-making is unavailable to single
agents and cannot be reduced to patterned behaviour.
Crucially, it involves movement as the manifestation of
intentional activity (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007). One
might object that because participatory sense-making is
intentional, it is inadequate for explaining aesthetic expe-
rience, which involves interaction with an artefact. This
point makes it a central task to examine, first, on what
grounds movement can be ascribed to artefacts that are
artworks, and second, what kinds of movement would
enable the viewer to feel with the artwork and cause the
emergence of aesthetic experience. The second task con-
cerns movements of both viewer and artwork, and such that
by regulating the dynamics are conducive to aesthetic
experience.
Regarding the first issue, there is evidence that artworks
can control viewers’ perception and shape their emotional
response, and in that sense may be held to manifest
intentional activity. Eye-tracking studies of how people
look at artworks show that artworks act on viewers’ per-
ception systematically and that viewers respond differen-
tially. The studies reveal common patterns based in
principles such as contrast, regularity, and saliency that
drive the attention to particular areas, suggesting that gaze
is guided by the artwork, but also reveal large variability
depending on subjects’ interest, artistic appreciation, pre-
vious experience, and knowledge, which means that the
effect of the artwork is not mandatory or predetermined
(Quiroga and Pedreira 2011). For instance, experimental
manipulations of paintings by Piet Mondrian concerning
the orientation, proportional relations, and colours of the
components have been shown to with certain regularity
steer the attention to other areas than the original paintings
do (ibid; Locher et al. 2005), whereas a series of studies of
how the eyes actively explore a painting by Francis Bacon
demonstrated significant difference between art-trained and
nonart-trained participants, e.g. art-trained observers fix-
ated regions important for spatial construction while non-
art-trained observers ignored them (Kapoula and Lestocart
2006).
Paintings also influence viewers’ emotions in pre-
dictable ways. Melcher and Bacci (2013) found that there
is a strong bottom-up and objective aspect to perception of
emotion in abstract artworks that may tap into basic visual
mechanisms, in that features such as colour, line, form, and
composition reliably prime a certain emotion. van Paass-
chen et al. (2015) report that affective evaluations of art in
terms of valence and arousal were consistent among
observers in ratings for representational and abstract art-
works, while judgments about beauty and wanting differ
between experts and novices. This agrees with Silvia’s
(2013) findings that knowledge emotions such as confusion
and interest that are appraisals of high novelty and degree
of comprehensibility have different weights for experts and
novices. To stress, these results should not be taken to
buttress the view that there are aesthetic primitives that
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determine the aesthetic value of a stimulus. Aesthetic
preferences and judgments depend on a wide range of
factors that may not be the same across contexts, similarly
to interpersonal preferences and judgments.
The cited evidence shows that artworks exert significant
influence on viewers, and that viewers’ reactions differ
systematically. Does it grant ascribing movement to works
of art? Movement is a self-sustained process from one
position to another that has a forward direction towards
something or somebody, and can fail or succeed. It creates
difference by making new facets of the environment
available to the agent that promise to meet her needs. Thus
movement has meaning or subjective value because the
difference it creates, makes a difference to the agent as an
individual, be it positive or negative, minor or major. That
artworks sometimes make a difference by revealing
unknown aspects of human life or existence to the audience
should be uncontroversial. Art is known to change the ways
in which people perceive or feel. Consequently, it would
seem part of the way art operates to influence or act on
viewers’ perception, behaviour, and understanding, which
means that artworks may be directed in the sense of tar-
geting the viewer’s cognition and mind.
In all, the discussion suggests that artworks can exhibit
movement and generally have the capacity to move and
produce movement in viewers, even if this may not be true
in every single case. I conclude that we are licensed to
explain aesthetic experience by the participatory sense-
making of viewer and artwork. It remains to deal with the
second task, and determine what movements regulate the
interaction dynamics and enable feeling with the artwork.
This issue will be examined in ‘‘Moving together: the
means for participatory sense-making’’ and ‘‘Bodily
engagement: the perception-action loop’’ sections. The
next section concerns entrainment where all interaction
begins.
Entrainment: the baseline
Entrainment is the ubiquitous tendency of physical and
biological systems to coordinate to autonomous, spatially
or temporally structured events or rhythmic movements,
and involves the detection of and response to rhythm and
the integration of the systems by synchronization (Clayton
et al. 2004; Glass 2001; Phillips-Silver et al. 2010; Wilson
and Wilson 2005). Rhythm consists in the patterned
recurrence of a regular or irregular element, e.g. a beat,
form, sound, or movement, in a temporal or spatial
sequence. Repetition constitutes rhythm if it involves
variations. There is great dissimilarity in the periodicity,
timing, intensity, frequency, regularity, amplitude, and
predictability of processes of entrainment. The
coordination between biological systems typically is rela-
tive by phase attraction, moving into and out of the zone
that surrounds perfect synchrony. The heartbeat, blood
circulation, and respiration are naturally occurring
rhythms.
Social entrainment between individuals is a special case
of spatiotemporal dynamic coordination. It usually is
implicit, subconscious, and automatic and causes mutually
constraining, stabilizing behaviour by alignment and
matching, e.g. motor mimicry when a speaker assumes the
same accent or tone of voice as another speaker during
conversation, movement coordination when two persons
fall into the same pace while walking side by side or
spontaneously make a certain gesture at the same time, and
mirroring when people adopt one another’s body posture
and orientation (Knoblich et al. 2011; Schmidt and
Richardson 2008).
Because entrainment comes naturally and the inclination
to entrain is strong and requires effort to control, people
can be expected to synchronize to the rhythm of any
stimulus, animate or not. Visitors to galleries and museums
are likely to automatically entrain to the rhythm of any
artwork that attracts the attention and match body or head
orientation, posture, core affect, gaze, and/or state of
arousal to it.
Rhythm is a well-known design principle in the visual
arts of all times (Sayre 2015). In two-dimensional images
such as regular paintings, lithographs, and drawings,
rhythm is created by the recurrence of lines, dots, shapes,
colour patches, strokes of the brush or pen or knife, and of
figurative motives, e.g. a fish repeated at different positions
or alongside with slight modifications, or children who
perform the same action, say, running. The recurring jux-
taposition of contrastive non-figurative elements also cre-
ates rhythm. To illustrate, Jackson Pollock made paint drip
from a can onto canvases placed on the floor or against the
wall and then used knives, trowels, and sticks to add depth
to the images. This resulted in paintings that lack clear
emphases and exhibit random rhythm. In contrast, Agnes
Martin’s signature paintings of pale grids and horizontal
bars or bands outlined in subtle pencil lines exhibit regular
rhythm. So does Bridget Riley’s ‘‘optical’’ paintings that
juxtapose contrastive colours arranged by serialized vari-
ations in size, shape, or placement in an all-over pattern.
The fact that entrainment is pervasive and mandatory
makes it compelling to ascribe it an important role. For
instance, it is known to cause stability, reliability, and
predictability, and promote cooperation and feelings of
familiarity and affiliation. On the other hand, this role will
not be specific to aesthetic experience: Entrainment is
involved in any kind of interaction, and therefore its
explanatory value is comparatively small in the present
case. Louwerse et al. (2012) remark that ‘‘pervasive
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synchrony is cognitively cheap but potentially useful
across contexts and functions.’’ They suggest that entrain-
ment is multifunctional and trades off during activities or
processes of high complexity. What use might it have in
the present context? Is there a trade-off?
I submit that by organizing and stabilizing the interac-
tion of coupled systems, entrainment creates an implicit
common ground that reduces uncertainty and provides the
baseline for intentional explorative behaviour. On the
present view, entrainment prepares for open-ended forms
of interaction such as engagement that are available to
conscious awareness but not necessarily cast in words.
Moving together: the means for participatory
sense-making
Aesthetic engagement constitutes the phenomenological
side of coupling to an artwork and provides the context for
moving, seeing, and feeling with art: It is where action,
perception, and lived experience meet. Drawing on the
fundamental similarity between aesthetic and second-per-
son engagement, I suggest that research about the origin of
empathy in dyadic interaction provides reason for giving
movement a central place in the account of aesthetic
experience.
According to developmental psychologist Peter Hobson,
interpersonal engagement is characterized by jointness, a
notion that echoes our definition of empathy as the
immediate recognition of another person’s experience as
distinct from your own. Hobson (2005:201) maintains that
jointness ‘‘comes with being moved just enough to sense
the psychological orientation of the other in oneself, but as
the other’s.’’ Consider the infant’s experience of fear in
response to the visual cliff. The visual cliff was designed to
test depth perception, and consists of a sheet of Plexiglas
that covers a cloth with a high-contrast draughtboard pat-
tern (Gibson and Walk 1960). On one side the cloth is
placed immediately beneath the Plexiglas, on the other it is
dropped 4 feet below. The cliff is merely visual since the
Plexiglas supports the infant’s weight. Hobson (2005)
asserts that the infant’s experience of the visual cliff will
change, if the infant can be made to respond to the care-
giver’s feelings instead of its own. By enacting the care-
giver’s feelings, the infant will be moved to occupy another
stance in relation to the world without physically changing
places and eventually crawl across the cliff. The experience
of emotionally moving through somebody else makes for
understanding that the world can be experienced in dif-
ferent ways and conversely, meaning can be known
together.
By analogy, I claim that works of art can change the
viewer’s perspective on the world by causing emotions and
experiences in her that constitute other ways of responding
to it than her own and thereby re-orient her. Swedish artist
Lena Cronqvist’s two paintings of a young girl standing up
and holding a doll in her left hand demonstrate how a
superficially straight-forward naturalistic rendering of an
everyday situation can move the viewer into an unsettling
state of mind foreign to the normality of the situation (Lilla
flicka i ro¨da skor med docka and Flicka med hand fo¨r
munnen och docka, both 1997; Castenfors and Fogelstro¨m
2014). A slight twisting of the representational conventions
of naturalistic art such as perspective, shape, and colour
and the conventional expectations about material daily life,
e.g. the appearance of dolls, will cause experiences in the
viewer that reflect another psychological orientation than
her own.
Bodily moving occurs in participant perception and the
co-enactment of behaviour, e.g. spoon-feeding when the
father opens his mouth while approaching the spoon to the
baby’s face in anticipation of the baby’s opening its mouth,
and the baby then joins into the father’s action. The qual-
itative experience of seeing and feeling another agent’s
movements moves the observer to match her own body
movements to those of the other agent, which results in the
observer’s being bodily moved through somebody else.
Sometimes bodily moving together implies sharing the
goal and, if successfully, reaching it together, as in the
spoon-feeding example. Hence, an agent can participate in
another agent’s attitudes and intentions by being (bodily)
moved to move with her. The matching movement does not
have to be an exact replica of the original: What matters is
the mutually manifest, multimodal coordination of bodily
orientation, intention, emotion, and attention that enables
empathy and cognitive and affective perspective-taking.
I maintain that similarly to how joint movement allows
parent and infant to recognize each other’s experiences and
attitudes in dyadic engagement, it allows viewers to
empathize with artworks in episodes of aesthetic engage-
ment: Movement constitutes the source of aesthetic expe-
rience. This line of thought receives support from art
educators, who tend to expose the inadequacy of discursive
knowledge. They stress the importance of embodied
learning to get in proper contact with art and develop an
understanding that in a tangible way involves the viewer.
Hubard (2007) provides several examples of embodied
learning that each promotes active engagement as a manner
of gaining a deeper understanding: replicating a form or
content by impersonation; making sounds in response to
visual stimuli; drawing the details of a sculpture, e.g. the
lines of a hand; transforming paper, e.g. looking at a
mandala and tearing, folding and forming the paper in
correspondence to its features. Hubard’s examples link
learning and experience to movement and intention,
motion and emotion, and elucidate that bodily engagement
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with an artwork supports empathy and can lead to per-
ceiving, acting, and feeling with it.
The remaining sections examine the relational dynamics
between viewer and artwork from the two perspectives of
bodily and emotional engagement. The common denomi-
nator is movement, which reflects the view that ‘‘[M]ove-
ments are at the centre of mental activity: a sense-making
agent’s movements—which include utterances—are the
tools of her cognition’’ (De Jaegher and Di Paolo 2007).
Bodily engagement: the perception–action loop
In a case study of dialogic looking in a gallery setting, McKay
and Monteverde (2003) argue that aesthetic experience
requires that subject and object are integral parts of each other
and ends in both being transformed. The image of two equal
players who mutually constitute or define each other is
attractive and recalls the characterization of structurally cou-
pled systems as mutually specifying each other. McKay and
Monteverde conclude that engaging in an active and super-
vised dialogue with the artwork leads to a unique and unified
perspective. Unfortunately, because they focus on the verbal
aspects of dialogue—externally with other viewers and art
educators, internally with the self, they by-pass the bodily,
experiential, and emotional aspects of understanding.
Generally, we make sense of the world by physically
moving around in it and discovering affordances for action
and attune to variations in the environment by modifying
and calibrating our perceptual expectations and motor
actions. Because agency structures perception, locomotion
in physical space will organize the perception of the
environment in ways that correspond to current needs and
afford novel actions (Yamamoto 2012). Those actions will
cause other variations and eventually result in further
specifications. In short, action specifies perception and
perception specifies action.
By the same token, visitors engage with artworks in the
exhibition room by moving around, circling the artwork,
looking at it from a distance or close up, from below or the
left or right, sitting down on the bench in the middle of the
room or taking tours focusing on several items at a time
and alternating gaze between them. Eventually they end up
with a dynamic map of the exhibition tuned to their
interests and needs.
Specifically, perceptual feedback from body movements
made in response to the visual experience of an artwork
will cause the viewer’s behaviour to change and so results
in other visual experience, etc. This progressive dynamics
constitutes the perception–action loop (PAL) of bodily
engagement. It allows viewers to visually explore artworks
by letting the artefact guide their movements through
physical space, in agreement with the observation that an
agent can participate in others’ attitudes and intentions by
simply following them, being (bodily) moved to move with
them, or by actively seeking to sense their orientation,
(bodily) moving to move with them. The viewer makes
sense of her actions in subjective or lived physical space
comparing actual with anticipated outcome and as she
discovers new routes through objective physical space.
Looking up close reveals detail while looking from the
far end of the room lets you take in the entire artwork at a
single moment, feeling its full force. Changing positions
discloses new aspects of it, leading to further changes of
position, and so on. Because perception is a function of
movement and position in space and time, walking around
or, on a smaller scale, moving in and out of postures and
alternating body orientation will modify the viewer’s per-
ception of the artwork substantially. Small variations in
body position and movement can have significant effects
on the perception of colour, size, height, width, texture, or
grain. Thus, surfaces, illumination, and shadows determine
how things look with respect to colour. Moving continu-
ously changes the light conditions of visual experience and
thereby also how the colour of a given object looks to the
agent. As you move relative to an object you are observing,
you encounter its visual potential by a series of aspects.
Each of the agent’s movements and actions enact her
experience of the artwork at the time of its performance.
Visual experience presents the world along two dimen-
sions: egocentred route maps from the perceiver’s vantage
point and allocentred survey maps from a disembodied
position accessed inferentially (Morganti 2016). Morganti
(2016:111) describes wayfinding as ‘‘a complex and con-
tinuously changing balance between the information
available both in route and survey perspective’’. In Mor-
ganti’s view, the agent’s surrounding space consists of the
affordances that at present are available to her, and how
things look to her is constrained by sensorimotor skill that
reflects learning. Morganti’s research in spatial cognition
suggests that the experience of a given artwork, say, one of
the paintings from Claude Monet’s series of water lilies,
will vary between agents and also within one and the same
agent with respect to time.
To summarize the discussion so far, in addition to
learning history, a viewer’s aesthetic experience will
depend on how she is moving through the exhibition space,
the movements she makes while doing so, and what parts
of material space she cares to integrate into her spatial map
along the way.
The more invitations to interact from artworks that a
viewer responds to and the more ways of responding she
masters, the more she will learn about her real possibilities
to explore art visually and her ability to control the process.
Perception partly is a socio-cultural skill, and so is motion.
Aiming to explain how high-level cognitive processes arise
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from low-level perceptual and motor abilities, Hutchins
(2010) argues that in culturally constructed settings, bodily
motion can acquire meaning by virtue of its relation to the
spatial organization of things that has developed in the past
to scaffold behaviour. In our times, viewers often learn to
interact with art by moving through exhibitions spaces.
That physical context modulates the relation between
aesthetic experience and viewing behaviour is attested by
Brieber et al. (2014) who examined free viewing of an art
exhibition in the context of either the museum or labora-
tory. The study reveals that participants in the museum
context liked the artworks more, found them more inter-
esting, and viewed them longer.
The exhibition space is a result of design, created with a
certain purpose. Such designated areas of the shared envi-
ronment come with a set of functional properties that afford
specific activities (Gibson 1986). Barker’s (1968) notion of
behaviour setting refers to a cohesive set of standing patterns
of behaviour that together with their physical surroundings
provide the spatial and temporal boundaries of an activity.
Behaviour settings regulate and facilitate the performance of
social activities, promoting their continued existence. To
illustrate, an art gallery has walls, doors and windows, and
within there are physical boundaries that divide the space
into sections, e.g. passages where visitors can rest their
senses, areas where they find information about the exhibi-
tion and the featured artists, larger spaces where the art-
works are located, spots (vantage points) designated for
observation of the individual pieces, an area close to the
front door where visitors can compose their thoughts and
make themselves ready to leave, etc.
The design of exhibition spaces encourages visitors to
engage with the artworks, but provides limited assistance for
sense-making—how much support visitors get is in the
hands of the management and the curator. The artist’s part in
this seems peripheral. Hautala (2015) strengthens this
impression in describing how an artist takes breaks to walk
around and view her artworks while hooking them in a
museum, following the same routes that she expects the
visitors will take, hanging the pieces accordingly. The
option to move the walls or change routes is not mentioned.
Separating the artist’s goal of achieving the artwork from the
curator’s goal of placing it in an appropriate historical and
theoretical context that respects tradition and praxis, Hautala
claims that artworks find their final form by being assigned a
location in the museum space, an address as it were.
Emotional engagement: the motion–emotion loop
Proprioception refers to the sense of movement and posi-
tion that includes tactility, gravitational orientation, force,
and kinesthesis. Kinesthesis refers to the awareness of
dynamic movement, a qualitatively felt kinetic flow that
may be experienced as expansive, abrupt, weakened, jag-
ged, curved, constricted, fast, etc. (Sheets-Johnstone 2010).
Kinetic flow is interrelated with affect. Exploring how her
experience in dance influences her educational research,
Stinson (1995:44) addresses the intersubjectivity of kines-
thetic sense, claiming that it
(…) heightens our awareness both of the other who is
outside us and of what is inside ourselves. It allows us
to notice what we are feeling in our own interior,
letting us know when we are stiff or fatigued or
upside down, whether our fingers are stretched apart
or close together. The kinesthetic sense thus both tells
us about ourselves and connects us with others as
embodied selves.
Sheets-Johnstone (1999) argues that the function of
emotion is to motivate action. Changes in body posture
manifest the onset of emotion that determines the agent’s
readiness to act, and exemplify the respect in which agents
are ‘‘moved to move’’ (Fuchs and Koch 2014). The causal
influence between emotion and action goes in both
directions; motion (the process of moving) and emotion
intrinsically connect (Sheets-Johnstone 1999). Hence body
posture may have a global impact and trigger emotion.
Furthermore, what may seem like minor behaviour can
have major consequences, e.g. orientation movements
performed relative to a target of action will affect the
agent’s emotional reactions to the target and thereby action
readiness. Orientation movements demonstrate that agents
can be ‘‘moved by movement’’ (Fuchs and Koch 2014).
From a theoretical position, Fuchs and Koch (2014)
argue that emotion results from the circular interaction
between affective qualities in the environment and the
agent’s sensations and movements and that the body
charges both self-experience and environment with valen-
ces. Specifically, body feedback promotes the experience
of emotion, formation of attitudes, and emotion and
behaviour regulation. Koch (2014) examined the effects of
dynamic body feedback from position and movement on
affect and attitude, relating movement rhythm (changes in
muscle tension and properties related to space, weight, and
time) associated with smooth versus sharp reversals to
movement shape (changes in the form or direction) in the
form of approach versus avoidance motor behaviour.
Movement rhythms were shown to influence affect and
attitude and modulate the influence of movement shape on
attitudes, e.g. smooth rhythms and approach movements
cause more positive attitudes.
The attested interdependence and continuity between
motion and emotion corroborate that aesthetic experience
originate in perceived (in the artwork) or executed (with
respect to the artwork) movement. This means that the
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viewer’s psychological reaction to an artwork depends on
the movements that the artwork produces in her while she is
looking at it. Bodily responses to works of art have move-
ment qualities and shapes and cause changes in body posture
that cue emotion. Emotion triggers approach or avoidance
behaviour and determine the manner and direction in which
the interaction between viewer and artwork proceeds.
Hence, body feedback from movements made in response to
works of art triggers an emotional response that modulates
affect and attitude, which is to say that the viewer is emo-
tionally moving with the artwork. The qualitative feel of
movement makes the interaction intrinsically meaningful.
Equally, the viewer’s psychological reaction may depend on
the emotion that the artwork causes her to act out, as in the
visual cliff. This makes the agent react to the displayed
content by the induced experience.
I will refer to this dynamics as the progressive motion–
emotion loop (MEL) of emotional engagement. Being moved
(emotionally) to movement or action and moving or acting to
be moved (emotionally) by a work of art both involve
moving with the artwork, sensing its psychological orien-
tation in oneself (cf. Hobson 2005).
Two works of art that exert strong effects on the viewer
and have the quality to move people will illustrate the
present line of thought. To begin, consider Yves Klein’s
paintings in monochrome blue, or the Blue Monochromes,
the first one made in 1957. They were painted with a roller
in a pure blue pigment IKB International Klein Blue, the
surface without any personal touch or marks. Then they
were mounted in front of the wall, not on it, leaving them
untouched by the forces of physical space. The intensity of
the blue colour draws the viewer into the canvas and is
intended to make her transcend the material painting and
feel totally immersed in hue, not allowing her to find a fix
point or centre of interest. Klein intended the boundary
between artwork and viewer to dissolve completely, lead-
ing to a state of heightened sensibility.
The second example is Lucio Fontana’s Concetto spa-
ziale, a collection of works begun in 1949 that consist in
holes and slashes on the surface of monochrome paintings,
the strongest impact being made by slashes on white, red
and raw canvases. The slashes turn the two-dimensional
work into a three-dimensional one and create depth where
there is none. They lead the viewer’s gaze towards the
holes in the canvas, and leaves her struggling to see what if
anything is hiding in the gaps. The slashes are obviously
manmade, brutal while precise, made with a sharp object
and by determinate rhythmic movements that cause motor
and emotional resonance in the viewer’s brain (Umilta
et al. 2012). The gaps, like the slashes, can seem both
intriguing and frightening, anticipating the unknown via
the darkness looming below the surface of the canvas.
Klein’s and Fontana’s works grab the viewer as it were
both bodily and mentally. In playing with the experience of
space, the paintings throw the viewer off balance, Klein’s
by producing the illusion of free floating and Fontana’s
because the cuts cause the perception of depth and dyna-
mism, creating the illusion of reality where there is none.
Concluding remarks
I have argued that non-discursive aesthetic experience
emerges when the viewer engages with the artwork in
physical and material space via the processes of bodily and
emotional engagement. These processes permit the viewer
to move with, be moved by, or move to be moved by the
artwork, all of which promote perceiving, acting, and
feeling with the artwork as in empathy and perspective-
taking between human agents. Perception, action, move-
ment, emotion, motion, and affect are inseparable elements
of the relational dynamics.
I have described the interaction by two processes oper-
ating at different temporal and spatial scales, arguing that
the perception–action loop organizes and structures visual
experience by specifying it, while the emotion-motion loop
generates qualitatively felt embodied meanings that mod-
ulate over-all affect and attitude. The distinction reflects
the explanatory purpose of exposing the two basic
dimensions or functions of aesthetic engagement. In prac-
tice the processing of aesthetic experience is not layered,
but there is interaction not only within processes, but also
between processes that succeed each other in time (hori-
zontally) and occur simultaneously (vertically).
Aesthetic experience is based in the bodily experience of
motion and direction and has an inevitable affective and
evaluative dimension. The experience of affect supports
on-line evaluation of the sense-making process as the
viewer continually adjusts her body movements to main-
tain interaction while moving in and out of synch. Move-
ment and motion are value-laden and condition the
viewer’s sensory experiences and feelings for the artwork
and the interaction as a whole, and therefore influence
actions and behaviour that unfold on the larger, interme-
diate temporal and spatial scales to which people usually
direct their conscious attention, for instance, when they as
visitors circle the museum space to find the optimal van-
tage points for taking in the individual artworks currently
on display one by one. By bodily and mentally moving
with the artwork viewers can actively exploit material
space for exploration and seek out positions and trajecto-
ries that are conducive to making sense.
We can think of engaging with an artwork as a second-
person relation characterized by openness and curiosity,
making way for understanding. As the interaction between
viewer and artwork unfolds, the agent will notice new aspects
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of the artwork and new patterns of variations will emerge that
increase the complexity and saturation of the interaction.
The view that bodily movement is essential to aesthetic
experience reflects the conception of the visual arts prac-
tices as enactive and literally making things visible.
According to the German painter Paul Klee (Gale 2013) art
does not reproduce the visible; rather, it makes visible.
Works of art consequently may provide guidance for see-
ing and knowing to artist and viewer alike.
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